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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration 
 
Around 25 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) are currently living in the 
European Union (EU), representing 5% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. 
allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a 
passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working 
together to build a cohesive society. 
  
Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the 
receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants 
belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While 
integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New 
means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation 
bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries 
seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants 
interact with their home country. 
  
INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in 
origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed 
tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to 
maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to 
support their rights). 
  
INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued 
by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-
state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other?  
What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what 
obstacles do they put in their way? 
  
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been 
produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries 
on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
  
INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built 
by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe. 
 
For more information: 
INTERACT 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Convento 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 770 
Email: migration@eui.eu 




Using the theoretical framework of transnational studies and sociology of religion, this paper identifies 
the most significant factors that influence the religious dimensions of the emigration countries: the 
majority or minority status of the migrant group in the receiving countries as well as the pre-existing 
level of politicization of religion in the sending countries. 
It shows that the interactions of sending and receiving countries take place in religious terms in a 
broader transnational space including deterritorialized religious and political actors. 
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Immigrant and religiosity 
According to a 2011 survey conducted in the 27 EU member states, all immigrant groups tend to be 
more religious than the native born population of the host country.1 Overall, immigrants pray more 
(30.02%) than native populations (21.86%) and attend religious services at least once a week .2 
Interestingly, the religiosity of the same immigrant group varies from one receiving country to another. 
For example, certain destination countries such as Greece, Poland, Portugal, and the UK demonstrate 
high levels of immigrant religiosity, however, Scandinavian and Eastern European countries (except 
Poland) tend to show lower levels of religiosity for immigrants as compared to other countries based on 
their “religious attendance and praying. There are also certain countries (like Cyprus, Greece, and 
Ukraine3
Unemployment and low levels of income do not increase immigrants’ religiosity. On the other 
hand, the level of education and the length of time spent in the host country tend to diminish the level 
of religiosity. Finally, Muslim immigrants are more religious on the three accounts (prayer, religious 
attendance, and self-declaration) than other immigrants. 
) whose native born population is more religious than the immigrant population. 
Regretfully, this survey is one of a kind. Undoubtedly, surveys on the religiosity of immigrants 
have increased in the last 15 years. But most of them are focused on Muslim immigrants in Western 
Europe. They have the inconvenience of being nationally defined and qualitative and therefore 
difficult to use in any comparative work.4 There are also surveys on the policy of receiving countries 
for religious recognition or in the fight against religious discrimination. They are also surveys on 
Muslim organizations and their relations with the states of receiving countries.5,6
There has been very little work done on the religious dimension of political actors from the sending 
countries, when they interact with migrants. There is no work at all on the dialectical interactions 
between migrants, countries of origin and countries of residence. In this perspective, the INTERACT 
project could open a pioneering field of research to overcome the binary approach to sending or 
receiving country policy analysis. 
 Through this angle, it 
is possible to get sparse information on the strategies of some sending countries to take advantage of 
this situation. 
I. Theoretical framework 
The analysis here is situated within transnational studies and sociology of religion. The former allows 
a broadening of the role of religion beyond state actors by looking into groups’ or individuals’ actions 
both in the sending and receiving countries. Therefore, the conventional approach to migrations is no 
longer adequate. Formerly, we understood migrations as flows of people from one nation-state to 
another; these flows were thought to indicate different sets of policies on the parts of net-immigrant 
                                                     
1 Tubergen, F. V., & Sindradottir, J. I. (2011). The religiosity of Immigrants in Europe: A cross-National Study. Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion , 272-288. 
2 Religiosity was measured by three questions: frequency of prayer, attendance at religious services and self declaration as 
religious. Based on subjective religiosity, the difference between immigrants and native population is small.  
3 Although Ukraine is not a member of the EU, it was included in the survey. 
4 For a systematic review of surveys on Muslims across European countries over the last two decades, see Jocelyne Cesari 
(2013), Why the West Fears Islam: Exploring Muslims in Liberal Democracies, New York, Palgrave MacMillan. 
5 Laurence, J. (2012). The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration.New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
6 S.Fetzer, J., & Soper, J. (2005). Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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and net-emigrant countries. The classical emigration/immigration distinction thus refers to the notion 
of a definitive transfer from one country to another. In this shrinking world, however, it seems that no 
one leaves a country “forever.” The possibilities for remaining in touch with the homeland are diverse 
and in the age of social media, increasingly efficient. In these conditions, people identify themselves 
with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, without 
particular conflicts or tensions. These transnational identities are by no means new, but they tend to 
have greater political and economic impact due to the increase in intensity and technological progress. 
However, transnational networks do not signify the end of the state power over its nationals. We will 
see that in some situations, the state can actually instrumentalize these networks for its political 
advantage, either domestic or international. 
In these conditions, the religious and cultural condition of migrants can be defined by three 
principal dimensions: the awareness of a religious identity, the existence of communal organizations, 
and the persistence of relationships (even imaginary ones) with the homeland.7
For this reason, religion cannot be apprehended exclusively as faith or belief. Additionally, while the 
surveys analyzed below show that migrants appear to be more religious than their fellow citizens in 
receiving countries, we should be aware that these features do not translate automatically into greater 
religious practices. Sociological work has highlighted an increasing disjunction between believing, 
behaving, and belonging among followers of all denominations. These three dimensions have 
historically been systematically linked or associated in the definition of a person’s religiosity. In other 
words, a person’s religiosity has long been defined by the inextricable connection of believing, behaving, 
and belonging. However, sociological analyses shed light on the disjunction of these three dimensions 
and apprehend this disjunction as modern forms of religiosity.
 These three 
dimensions usually define the diaspora condition. 
8,9
The studies discussed in the following sections, show that belonging is more relevant than 
believing in understanding the political dimension of religion. In fact, belonging is often strongly 
asserted even when migrants lack belief. The belonging identity is strengthened when religion is 
embedded within the national identity of the sending country (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
Poland). A difference emerges between being a “practicing Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox” and just 
“being Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox.” So when people say that they are very much Muslims, it does 
not mean that they are pious. This loose cultural identity can become an asset for the sending country. 
 Thus, a person can believe without 
automatically behaving and belonging; can belong without believing or behaving; or can behave without 
believing or belonging. For example, surveys have shown that many Christians maintain private, 
individual religious beliefs but do not practice on a regular basis (i.e., believing without behaving), or in 
some cases, Christian identity has taken on cultural rather than spiritual meanings.  
In order to capture the religious dimension of the different state and non-state actors, this paper will 
analyze the interactions between receiving countries and sending countries in the religious domain. 
From a literature review, it is possible to distinguish three situations that influence the actions of 
sending/receiving countries as well as of migrants: the minority condition, the minority within the 
minority and the majority situation. The religious minority situation refers to cases where the religion 
of the migrant groups is a minority within the receiving country. Muslim immigrants in Christian 
western countries are a paradigmatic example of this situation. There is also the condition of the 
religious minority within the minority migrant group, like Alevis within the Turkish Sunni migrants in 
western Europe. Finally, there are circumstances where the religion of the migrant group is similar to 
the religion of the receiving country. In these cases, the majority situation is not evaluated in numbers 
but in terms of proximity or familiarity with the migrants’ religion. For example, Germany and the UK 
                                                     
7 Vertovec, S. (2009). Transnationalism. London; New York: Routledge. 
8 Davie, G. (1994). Religion in Britain since 1945. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
9 Leger, D. H. (2003): Religion and Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa. Transit: Europaische Revue, pp 101-19. 
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are Protestant countries. However, we have included Catholic migrants to these countries in the 
majority/majority situation, because they share a Christian background and because there are already 
Catholic groups in receiving countries. 
We will first present the features common to all migratory situations, i.e. disconnection between 
national and religious identities, cultural discrepancy between the clerics of the sending countries and 
the religious communities in the receiving countries, and influence of transnational religious groups 
(section II). We will then address the specifics of the minority condition, (sections III and IV) as well 
as of the majority condition (section V). We will conclude by discussing the positive or negative role 
of religion on the integration of migrants in the receiving countries. 
II. Influence of Religion on Migrants 
An analytical review of the existing literature highlights three major aspects of religious influence on 
immigrants: disconnection of religious and national identities, the gap between clerics and religious 
communities in the receiving countries, and the influence of transnational religious movements on the 
religious condition of migrants. 
A) The disconnection between religion and national identities 
The immigration situation creates new conditions of identification where personal attachment to a 
given religion prevails over belonging to the national community of the sending country. In this 
regard, sociological surveys show that Muslims in Europe tend to redefine their attachment to Islam in 
their new countries of residence through personal belonging to the religion more than through 
collective belonging to an Islamic or national group.10
This disconnection between religion and national identity also appears vis-à-vis the country of 
residence. According to a report from Vincent Geisser and Francoise Lorcerie about Muslims in 
Marseilles, only 30% of the city’s population introduced their identity as Muslim.
 Attachment to Islam becomes disconnected 
from attachment to the national community of origin (unlike the first generation of immigrants).  
11 Similarly, 2011 
IFOP polling shows that Muslims separate their religious values from their French national identity.12
In some surveys, the disconnect is expressed in cultural terms. For example, in a 2009 survey, 
Turks who are born in Germany (32%) and those who are immigrants to Germany (52%) declared that 
they do not feel attached to the German national identity when it comes to the education of children 
and gender relations: compare this with the 9% of Germans who thought the same way. In summary, 
the study showed that the perception of German Turks, at least in this respect, is similar to their 
counterparts in Turkey rather than their fellow citizens in Germany.
 
13
                                                     
10 For a comprehensive analysis of these surveys across Western and Eastern Europe, see Jocelyne Cesari (ed), Handbook of 
Islam in Europe, Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
 Similarly, according to a 2012 
study by the Federal Ministry of Interior about integration and Muslims in Germany, a significant 
minority is particularly skeptical about integration. Only 52% of non-German Muslims favored 
integration, while 48% refuse to integrate, and prefer to live in separation from the German 
11 Report on Muslims in Marseilles, France Released. (2011, October 17). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/10/17/report-on-muslims-in-marseilles-france-released/ 
IFOP poll suggests that fewer than half of French Muslims are practicing. (2011, May 17). Retrieved July 19, 2013, 
from Euro-Islam: http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/05/17/ifop-poll-suggests-that-fewer-than-half-of-french-muslims-are-
practicing/ 
12 New Publication: Muslims in Paris . (2012, August 3). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2012/08/03/new-publication-muslims-in-paris/ 
13 Survey: German and Turkish value systems. (2009, November 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/11/30/erste-internationale-studie-zur-wertewelt-der-deutschen-deutsch-turken-und-turken/ 
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mainstream. These figures change slightly when taking into account German Muslims: While, then, 
78% of Muslim favor integration, 22% prefers a more separatist approach. Overall, about 24% of non-
German Muslims reject integration and question Western values. 14
This disconnect with the dominant cultural values of the national community has to be 
distinguished from loyalty to the political institutions of the receiving countries. Usually quantitative 
surveys of Muslims across Europe show an attachment to the national institutions of the country of 
residence, though results can be contradictory and vary from one European country to another.
  
15
 A survey of Muslim youth in the UK compared to their counterparts in various European countries 
show that the former feel more integrated within their national community of residence. For example, 
youth of Asian origin in Britain feel more British in schools than their counterparts born or raised in 
Germany and France. Another example was observed in the second generation Pakistani and Indian 
Muslim immigrants in the UK, who feel more integrated than Moroccan or Algerian Muslim youth in 
France. Also, young Turks and former Yugoslavs in Germany feel less integrated than their 
counterparts in the UK.
  
16
According to a survey by the British think tank Demos, British Muslims have a greater national 
identity attachment to the UK than the average British citizen. In other words, for them, being British 
is something they are proud of and they would like to contribute to the future of the UK. Furthermore, 
the 2000 survey suggested that 83% of Muslims were happier than the national average among British 
citizens of 79%. This research refuted the myth that Britain Muslims get their identity primarily from 




The same trend is identifiable in other parts of Europe. According to the Metroscopia Report, 
Muslim immigrants living in Spain put confidence in the national identity of Spain much more than 
Spaniards do. So Spanish Muslims trusted the national identity of Spain and felt themselves to be part 
of national ideals such as justice, the Parliament, the King, and the Catholic Church. This study’s 
results demonstrated that liberaland tolerant Spanish Muslims are not trouble makers, but rather they 
feel at home in Spain and at the same time they can practice their faith without mixing it with the 
national ideals of Spain.
 
18
On the other hand, other surveys attest to frustration and discontent vis-à-vis the receiving 
countries. For example, a 18 month-long study conducted in 2007 in England, Scotland and Wales 
found that young Muslims express frustration about the way they are depicted in the media and they 
do not feel that British society conforms to Muslim “ideals.” They also define themselves as patriotic 
and they aspire to serve British national ideals.
 
19
                                                     
14 New Study on Muslims and Integration in Germany. (2012, March 5). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/03/05/new-study-on-muslims-and-integration-in-germany/ 
  
15 Nyiri, Z. (2007). Gallup World Poll. “Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists. Retrieved July 
19, 2013, from Gallup Poll: http://www.gallup.com/poll/27409/Muslims-Europe-Basis-Greater-Understanding-Already-
Exists.aspx 
16 Muslim youths in UK feel much more integrated than their European counterparts . (2009, August 20). Retrieved July 19, 
2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/07/02/british-muslims-have-more-sense-of-belonging-
than-their-white-counterparts/ 
17 New Survey Reveals: Britain’s Muslims Proud and Optimistic. (2011, November 28). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/11/28/new-survey-reveals-britain%E2%80%99s-muslims-proud-and-
optimistic/ 
18 Muslims express more trust in Spanish institutions than Spaniards. (2010, April 8). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2010/04/08/muslims-express-more-trust-in-spanish-institutions-than-spaniards/ 
19 Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims. (2009, September 7). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/09/07/seen-and-not-heard/ 
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Besides media treatment and negative political discourses, the assertive religiosity of young 
Muslims is another reason for the gap with their non-Muslim co-citizens. According to the 2011 
census, 1 out of 10 youths younger than 25 in the UK describes themselves as Muslim. While the 
population of immigrant Christians such as Catholics from Poland and other denominations from 
different countries such as Nigeria are dramatically increasing in the UK, the population of British-
born Christians has decreased about 15% from 2001 to 2011.20 According to a 2007 survey, young 
British Muslims’ religiosity is growing. As a result, they feel challenged to relate with non-Muslim 
British youth. The identity of these young British Muslims is expressed in their strong preference for 
Islamic schools and sharia law, which set them apart from the “lifestyle” of mainstream society.21
According to the 2011 IFOP mentioned above, 41% of the respondents define themselves as both 
observant and believing, 34% of them define themselves as only believers, 22% defined themselves as 
only Muslim origin, and 3% said they did not have any religion. These numbers, confirmed by 
previous surveys of the same kind, put them at odds with their fellow French citizens that do not 
express the same levels of religious attachment or practices.  
  
According to a 2012 report of the National policy unit SCP, Muslims’ religiosity is increasing in 
the Netherlands. From 1998 to 2011, mosque attendance among Muslims of Moroccan origin 
increased from 9% to 33%. This report also suggests that observant Muslims tend to identify with their 
country of origin more than with the Dutch national community.22 According to 2008 Dutch research, 
young Muslims do not believe that they can openly practice their Islamic identity, as they do not think 
they have enough resources to improve their faith and society does not help them. These young Dutch 
Muslims considered that when they openly show their Islamic identity and practice their faith, they do 
not feel welcome and fully accepted as citizens in the Netherlands.23
The same disconnect appears for immigrants who share the religion of the receiving country. 
Additionally, centralized religious institutions like the Catholic Church can reinforce the gap and lead 
to the isolation of immigrant religious communities. Based on a 2007 survey conducted among 
children and adolescents in Germany, Catholics who come from immigrant families are more 
observant than young indigenous Catholics.
  
24
Several studies have emphasized that local more than national community is a strong identifier 
among Muslims across Europe. According to research on the Muslim community of Waltham Forest, 
one of the London’s 2012 Olympic boroughs, the respondents express a strong attachment to their 
 According to the same survey, migrants are taught 
through parishes about values such as “trust, solidarity, and help”, in ways that strengthen the migrant 
group. Anthropologist Georg Elwert qualifies this process as inner integration. Usually parishes do not 
facilitate interaction between immigrants and local Catholics. As a result, migrant Catholics do not 
have opportunities to be exposed to Catholicism from the German point of view.  
                                                     
20 Census figures show Christianity in sharp decline while belief in Islam dramatically increases . (2013, May 23). Retrieved 
July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info : http://www.euro-islam.info/2013/05/23/census-figures-show-christianity-in-sharp-
decline-while-belief-in-islam-dramatically-increases 
21 Living Apart Together. (2007, January 31). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info : http://www.euro-
islam.info/country-profiles/germany/ 
22 Dutch Muslims Report Increasing Religiosityby Euro-Islam . (2012, November 13). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2013/05/23/census-figures-show-christianity-in-sharp-decline-while-belief-in-
islam-dramatically-increases/ 
23 Needs of Dutch Muslim youth explored in recent report. (2008, November 24). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2008/11/24/needs-of-dutch-muslim-youth-explored-in-recent-report/ 
24 Baier, D., Pfeiffer, C., Rabold, S., & Julia Simonsan, C. K. (2010). Kinder and Jugendliche in Deutschland: 
Gewalterfahrungen, Integration, Medienkonsum . Kriminologisches Fordschungsinstitut Niedersachsen E.V , pp. 85-8. 
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neighborhood in contrast to their attachment to Britain, while the non-Muslims in the same 
neighborhood show a greater attachment to Britain over their neighborhood.25
The consequences on attachment to the sending countries of these emerging Muslim identities in 
Europe have not been systematically studied. We know that being a Muslim in France or Germany is 
increasingly disconnected from national attachment to Algeria or Turkey. But this does not mean that 
religious interactions with the countries of origin have stopped: they usually happen through family, 
business or social networks, and are more influential when they materialize outside the institutional 
channels of the sending state (Ministry of Religious Affairs, embassies, etc.). As explained above, 
religious identity is more and more shaped within transnational semantic spaces in which national 
frameworks are included but not exclusive anymore. For example, the fluid and multi-layered 
religious and national identities of the German-Turkish youth were reflected in a research conducted 
by Selcuk Sirin among 1,400 participants who were 18-25 years old. It shows that these young 
peoples’ collective identity cannot be classified as Islamist vs. secularist. Instead, Turkish youth have 
multiple identities, with the dimensions of belonging to secular movement (Ataturkism) and Islamic 
identity that shape their political identity. They do notdefine themselves according to Ataturk’s ideals 
or Islamic ideals, but they say “I like Atatürk and I also feel like a Muslim.”
  
26
In sum, the disconnect between religious belonging and the dominant culture of the receiving 
country does not lead to lack of loyalties but to multiple allegiances that are not seen as conflicting or 
contradictory. Nor does it translate into an exclusive link with the sending country, which is not seen 
as an ideal place for the fulfillment of migrants’ personal values, especially in the second or third 
generation. The country of origin still triggers sentimental attachment through family links, but it is 
not the place to definitively return to.  
 
This cultural gap is also reflected in the tensions that often occur between clerics from the countries 
of origin and religious immigrant communities. 
B) Discrepancy between the Cultural Background of Clerics and the Religious Expectations of 
the Communities in Receiving Countries 
The religious role of the countries of origin can clash with the religious expectations of the migrants. 
For example, in 2008, during Ramadan, French-born Muslims complained to the representative body 
of French Islam (CFCM) about the lack of French language skills among these imported imams.27
Even in the case of training independent from the country of origin, the questions of external 
influence on the curriculum, and lack of cultural skills of the imam, remain. For instance, the 
European Institute of Human Sciences de Saint-Leger-de Fougeret, set in Burgundy, has for decades 
trained imams who intend to minister to the French Muslim population in France, but without great 
success. The institute has been under close governmental scrutiny because of its alleged links with the 
Muslim Brothers. The annual number of students is very small, and the training still not up to the 
demands of the French Muslim population. Generally, initiatives from “indigenous” Muslims across 
Europe to counter external influences are almost non-existent. One exception is the Buhara project in 
Berlin: a training institute for imams in the “Sufi” tradition was initiated in 2009 by German-born 
 
More generally, the aforementioned surveys among Muslims across Europe attest to this gap between 
the sociological reality of the religious minority and the inadequate clerics from the sending countries. 
                                                     
25 New Publication: Muslims in Paris . (2012, August 3). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2012/08/03/new-publication-muslims-in-paris/ 
26 Interview with Selçuk Şirin: “Turkish Youths Have Multiple Identities. (2009, September 1). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from 
Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/09/01/interview-with-selcuk-sirin-turkish-youths-have-multiple-
identities/ 
27 Disagreements emerge in the CFCM with the end of Ramadan. (2008, October 5). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam: http://www.euro-islam.info/2008/10/05/disagreements-emerge-in-the-cfcm-with-the-end-of-ramadan/ 
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Muslims in reaction of the overpowering presence of foreign born imams who lack social 
understanding and language abilities to relate to Muslims in Germany.28
It is worth noting that a similar gap exists when the religion of the migrants is the same than the 
majority of the receiving country. For example, the increased arrival of Polish immigrants to the UK 
since 2004 has resulted in an influx of “Easy Jet priests”, i.e. Catholic priests flown into Britain to 
provide pastoral care to migrants. It appears that their cultural and national background does not fit the 
British national context. “They enter an already formed social field which has been shaped by power 
struggles and politics they know little, or nothing, about. A training program for Polish priests 
relocating to the UK was deemed unnecessary by Polish Catholic missiologists; hence no assistance 
was given to Polish priests prior to their arrival in the UK. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004 is perceived as a threat to Polish Catholicism by some 
Catholic politicians and clergy and by others as an opportunity for Polish Catholics to evangelize 
secular Europe. It is a combination of these attitudes that shapes the behavior and strategies of Polish 
clergy in the UK.”
  
29
The increased influence from transnational religious groups is another challenge for the clerics of 
sending countries. 
  
C) Influence of Transnational Religious Groups on Religious Immigrant Communities  
The proliferation of religious authorities and the shrinking realm of their authority is by no means a 
new phenomenon, and it has been the subject of many studies.30 Both mass education and new forms 
of communication have contributed to the increase of actors who claim the right to talk on behalf of 
any religious tradition in both authoritative and normative ways. Therefore, established religious 
figures, such as the sheikhs of Al-Azhar or Medina, are increasingly challenged by the engineer, the 
student, the businessman, and the autodidact, who mobilize the masses and speak for Islam in sports 
stadiums, in the blogosphere, and over airwaves worldwide. This trend predates the Internet and is 
related to public education programs and the increased availability of new technological 
communicative mediums such as magazines, cassette tapes, and CDs.31 However, the internet has 
added a new element to this proliferation of religious voices: the greater influence of globalized 
authority figures that have an audience beyond their particular cultural background. This trans-
nationalization of religious voices can be defined as neo pan-Islamism. There are multiple forms of 
this contemporary pan-Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood being the one that has been the most studied.32
Interestingly, the Muslim Brothers, at least for the most part, tend to foster national allegiance to 
the receiving country rather than to the sending country or the global ummah. For this reason, they 
stand on the same side as the sending and receiving countries, in the competition against global 
  
                                                     
28 Berlin Muslims to train imams at new school. (2009, January 11). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/01/11/berlin-muslims-to-train-imams-at-new-school/ 
29 Trezbiatowska, M, (2010) “The Advent of the EasyJet Priest: Dilemma of Polish Catholic Integration in the UK, 
Sociology, vol 44 (6),1055-1072, op-cit p.1057 
30 Eickelman.D & Pescatori, J (2004), Muslim Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Eickelman, D. (2010). 
Mainstreaming Islam: Taking Charge of the Faith. Encounters (2), 185-203. 
31 Traditionally, authority was conferred according to one’s theological knowledge and mastery of the methodologies used to 
interpret this knowledge. Only those who possessed knowledge that had been passed down through a chain of authorities or a 
line of recognized masters could claim legitimacy as religious leaders. Though formal education was an important 
component throughout much of the Muslim world, the transmission of knowledge did not always rely on formal education, 
especially if the knowledge being passed down was esoteric in nature (as was the case among the Sufi masters).  
32 Marechal, Brigitte, (2008). The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse . Belgium : Brill Academic Pub . 
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Salafism.33
Today, the conditions for the communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the 
ummah (the community of Muslim believers) all the more effective as a concept, especially 
considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been waning. The imagined ummah has a variety 
of forms, the most influential of which emphasizes direct access to the Qur’an and Muslim unity that 
transcends national and cultural diversity. In this sense, those extolling this modern trend can be called 
pan-Islamists even though the restoration of the caliphate is no longer their priority.
 The same logic is at work among religious movements like Christian Evangelicals, who 
challenge the established religious institutions of both sending and receiving countries. 
34
Wahhabism is characterized by a rejection of critical approaches to the Islamic tradition. Mystical 
approaches and historical interpretations alike are held in contempt. Orthodox practice can be defined 
as a direct relation to the revealed Sources (Qur’an and hadith), with no recourse to the historical 
contributions of the various juridical schools (madhab).  
 It is worth 
noting that not all these movements are reactionary or defensive. For this reason, a distinction must be 
drawn between the Wahhabi/Salafi and Tablighi movements, on one hand, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, on the other. Both trends dominate global interpretations of Islam across Europe but 
have very different positions vis-à-vis modernity.  
In this literalist interpretation of Islam, nothing must come between the believer and the text: 
customs, culture, and Sufism must all be done away with. The heirs of this rigorist and puritanical line 
of thought are the existing Saudi religious establishment, also known as Salafi. Adherents of 
Wahhabism have rejected all ideas and concepts that are deemed Western, maintaining a strictly 
revivalist agenda. As a stringently revivalist movement, Wahhabism seeks the “Islamization of 
societies,”35
The significant difference between the global Salafi Islam of today and the original Wahhabi period 
is a difference in audience: in other words, Salafi decisions and interpretations are no longer limited to 
the Saudi kingdom, but are now followed by Muslims around the world. The fatwas of Sheikh Abdul 
Aziz Ibn Baaz (d. 1999), Grand Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, and of Sheikh Al-Albani (d. 1999) are 
the common points of reference for their followers in Europe and the United States, and more 
generally throughout the Muslim world. The movement has succeeded in imposing its beliefs not as 
one interpretation among many but as the global orthodox doctrine of Sunni Islam.  
 which entails formulating contemporary ways of life in relation to the conditions of 
seventh century Arabia by “returning to the sources” whose “true meaning,” Wahhabis argue, was lost 
over the centuries following the Prophet Muhammad’s death.  
The considerable financial resources of the Saudi state have also helped create this religious 
monopoly. In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began investing in a number of international organizations that 
“widely distributed Wahhabi literature in all the major languages of the world, gave out awards and 
                                                     
33 Salafism is a multifaceted revivalist movement within Islam (the name being a reference to as-salaf as-salah, or the pious 
ancestors) that advocates a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and a rejection of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence 
(Madahib).  
34 The Hizb ut-Tahrir party is one of the most significant contemporary pan-Islamist movements that still advocates for the 
restoration of the Caliphate. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it claims branches in the Muslim world as well as Europe and 
the United States. In Great Britain, the party is known under the name Muhajirrun, and was active in the public sphere, 
particularly before September 11th. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the 
Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996). 
35 “Movements that were conceived as movements of ‘renewal’ were in fact more a part of the ongoing processes of 
Islamization of societies on the frontiers of the Islamic world. They were, in effect, part of the ‘formation’ of the Islamic 
societies rather than the ‘reformation’ of existing ones.” John Obert Voll, “Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic 
Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1999) 516–17. 
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grants, and provided funding for a massive network of publishers, schools, mosques, organizations, 
and individuals.36
In the West, this dawa (proselytization) resulted in the building of new Islamic centers in Malaga, 
Madrid, Milan, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and 
Toronto to name just a few; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; and the 
multiplication of multilingual Internet sites. In March 2002, the official Saudi magazine Ain al-Yaqin 
estimated that the Saudi royal family has “wholly or partly financed” approximately 210 Islamic 
centers, 1,500 mosques, 202 colleges, and 2,000 Islamic schools in Muslim-minority countries.
  
37 It is 
important to note that these estimates do not include the number of institutions funded by the Saudi 
Government in its entirety or other sources within Saudi Arabia that finance Wahhabi proselytizing.38 
According to some estimates, the Saudi Kingdom spent over $80 billion on various Islam-related 
causes in Muslim-minority countries between 1973 and 2002.39 King Fahd alone invested over $75 
billion dollars in the construction of schools, mosques, and Islamic institutions outside of the Kingdom 
in the 1970s and 1980s.40,41 This massive effort of propagation has contributed to the promotion of 
Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.42
The construction of mosques, schools, and other Islamic institutions is only one Saudi strategy to 
circulate the Wahhabi ideology. They also rely heavily on media to promote and spread their message, 
whether through the circulation of handouts, the creation of websites, or the airing of satellite television 
shows. For example, in 1984, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opened the King Fahd Complex for Printing 
the Holy Qur’an in Medina. According to the website of the now-deceased King Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, 
the Complex produces between 10 and 30 million copies of the Qur’an each year. Copies of the Qur’an 
also are available in Braille, as are video and audio recordings of Qur’anic recitations.  
 
 
                                                     
36 Fadl, A. E. (2005),The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (pp. 73-75). San Francisco : HarperOne. 
37 Macleod, L. B. ( 2003 , September 15). After 9: SAUDI ARABIA: Inside the Kingdom. Retrieved 07 19, 2013, from Time 
Magazine: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005663,00.html. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Alexiev, A. (2003, June 26). Wahhabism: State-Sponsored Extremism Worldwide,” testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security. Retrieved July 19, 2013, from United States Senate 
Committe on the Judiciary: 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281fee07b5&wit_id=4f1e0899533
f7680e78d03281fee07b5-2-2 
40 (2006). In R. Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabi (p. 10). New York: Oxford 
University. 
41 According to its website, the King Fahd Foundation has wholly or partially funded thirty such projects in Africa, six in 
South America, 23 in Asia, six in Australia and Oceania, twelve in Europe, and 22 in North America. (The website is 
http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/m400.htm)  
42 In addition to funds coming straight from the Saudi government, the Kingdom also supports proxy organizations that 
spread Wahhabism. A notable organization that depends on Saudi funding is the Muslim World League (MWL, Rabitat 
al-‘Alam al-Islami). Today, the Muslim World League oversees a number of non-governmental organizations such as the 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Holy Qur’an 
Memorization International Organization, the International Islamic Organization for Education, Makkah Al-Mukarramah 
Charity Foundation for Orphans, the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur’an and Sunnah, The World Supreme 
Council for Mosques, and The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Council. Although to the outside world they strongly 
emphasize their strong humanitarian aims (providing relief, assisting orphans, etc.), these organizations are often focused 
on propagating a Salafist interpretation of Islam. Many, including the International Islamic Relief Organization and the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth concentrate on setting up and supporting mosque centers with an orthodox persuasion, 
as well as hiring, training and subsidizing imams with Salafi/Wahhabi orientation, and publishing and disseminating 
Salafist literature. 
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By 2000, the complex had produced 138 million copies of the Qur’an translated into twenty 
languages.43 It is extremely difficult to gauge the precise influence exerted by Wahhabism on Muslim 
religious practice. In the case of European Muslims, the influence cannot simply be measured by 
statistics. In a minority culture lacking both institutions for religious education and the means by 
which to produce new forms of knowledge, the easy access to theology that Salafism offers is one of 
the main reasons for its popularity. The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-
Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabite standards. In other words, even if most 
Muslims do not follow Wahhabite dress codes—white tunic, head covering, beard for men, niqab44 for 
women—the Salafi norm often becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought to be.45 
Despite the strong presence of many different interpretations at the grassroots level,46
The appeal of transnational movements and their challenges for established religious groups are 
also reflected in the growing influence of evangelical movements in Europe. The EEA’s (European 
Evangelical Association) Brussels office represents 15 million European evangelicals from 35 
countries to the European Union. 
 the Salafi 
revivalist interpretation of Islam dominates the Internet dawa. Salafis oppose all forms of nationalized 
Islam either in the receiving or sending countries, at least rhetorically. For this reason, tensions 
between national religious authorities and Salafis are reported everywhere. 
47 Compared to Latin America or Africa, the diffusion of evangelical 
Christianity in Europe remains small. Evangelicals represent less than two percent of the European 
population.48
While traditional churchgoing has been on the decline in the UK over the past decade, immigration 
has made Christianity more charismatic and fundamentalist. The most significant change has been the 
growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity among migrants from Africa and Latin America. In 
Lewisham, there are 65 Pentecostal churches serving the Nigerian community, and others serving the 
Congolese. Ghanaian and Ivorian Professor Mike Kenny of IPPR said: “The research shows that 
recent waves of inward migration have given a boost to some of the UK’s established faith 
 Some 4.5 million of the UK’s foreign-born population claim to have a religious 
affiliation. Of these, around a quarter are Muslim, while more than half are Christian with Polish 
Catholics and African Pentecostals among the fastest-growing groups. 
                                                     
43 Provision of copies of the Holy Quran. (n.d.). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from King Fahd Abdulaziz: 
http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/m600.htm 
44 A cloth covering the face in Wahhabi law. 
45 Another group, albeit with much less financial resources, that takes a traditionalist and legalistic approach to Islam is the 
Tabligh, sometimes referred to as the Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam. The Tabligh is usually described as a pious and 
proselytizing movement whose primary aim is to promote Islamic education. The essential principle of this sect within 
the Deobandi movement—founded in 1927 in India—is that every Muslim is responsible for spreading the values and 
practices of Islam. In the last two decades, this movement has gained a wide following, especially in Europe and the 
United States. In these conditions, competition rages in the West between Tablighis and Salafis, and anathemas rain 
down on both sides. 
46 There are Muslim Brotherhood groups that are very active at the grassroots level and in creating Muslim organizations to 
cooperate with political institutions (see Marechal, Brigitte, Les Freres Musulmans en Europe: Racines et Discours 
(Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourses), (BRILL, Leuvenm, 2008).There are religious authorities related to 
some Muslim countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey) who propagate a traditional interpretation of Islam. Finally, there 
is a proliferation of independent authorities: scholars (Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford University, 
and known for his reformist thinking), social activists (Hamza Yusuf, Director of the Zeytuna Institute in San Francisco) 
and more traditional authorities (Cheikh Qaradawi, who became global with his show on Al Jazeera called Al Sharia wal 
Hayat (Sharia and Life). For a typology of the different religious leaders operating in Europe and in the USA, see Cesari, 
J., When Islam and Democracy Meet (New York: Palgrave, 2006).  
47 The European Evangelical Alliance. (n.d.). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Europeanea: http://www.europeanea.org/ 
48 Bryant, L. ( 2006, July 25). Evangelical Churces Florishing in Europe. Retrieved July 19, 2013, from WorldWide 
Religious News: http://wwrn.org/articles/22243/ 
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communities at a time when Britain’s society and culture are generally more secular, and smaller 
numbers of the indigenous population are regularly attending churches.”49
Recent migration trends are altering the faith map of the UK. Their biggest impact is being felt in 
the largest cities: London above all, where a rich mosaic of different faith communities has come into 




France has witnessed an eight-fold increase in Evangelical Christians during the past half century, 
from roughly 50,000 to 400,000.  
 
Evangelical movements also made significant in-roads in the Eastern parts of Europe, especially in 
the 1990s after the collapse of communism, although their influence has stalled since the early 2000s. 
The stagnation has been explained by a greater resistance of the traditional churches than in Latin 
America, as well as a greater suspicion towards movements seen as foreign and Western.51
Overall, we are missing localized studies on the influence of these transnational movements on the 
religious landscape of the sending countries. Most surveys on Salafis focus on their doctrine and 
practices in different local contexts but do not systematically investigate the connection with their 
counterparts in countries of emigration.
 
52
When it comes to the situation of religious minorities, the focus of studies has mostly been on the 
sociology of clerics as well as on Islamic organizations, much less on the role of religion in the 
personal integration of immigrants. 
  
III. When the Religion of the Sending Country is in Minority in the Receiving Country 
The minority/majority divide has usually favored the sending countries’ interests vis-à-vis the 
receiving countries’, especially when there is no strong dominant religious institution in the sending 
countries. For example, in the initial phase of Muslim immigration to the West in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the religious institutions of the sending state had a monopoly on the representation of the religious 
interests of its nationals, especially vis-à-vis the political institutions of the receiving countries. 53
In the case of Catholic immigration, the state is supplanted by the Church, which sometimes has 
divergent interests, as we shall see below in the case of Spanish immigration in Germany. 
 
The state’s or church’s monopoly is usually challenged and weakened by the rise of “autochthone” 
religious authorities in the receiving countries and by the competition of transnational religious 
networks. However, since 9/11, the securitization of immigration policies and the war against 
terrorism have created new “religious opportunities” for sending countries, especially Muslim ones. 
An analytical review of the existing literature reveals that the decline of the religious legitimacy of 
clerics from sending countries has been a major focus of study as well as of political concern. The 
quick depreciation among emigrants of the religious leadership from the country of origin has 
deprived sending states of an important resource of political influence. This situation has been 
extensively studied in the case of Muslim minorities in Western Europe. 
                                                     
49 Ibid. 
50 West, E. (2009, December 14). I'm not surprised Evangelical Christianity is on the rise. Retrieved July 19, 2013, from The 
Telegraph: http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/edwest/100019857/im-not-surprised-evangelical-christianity-is-on-the-rise/ 
51Agadjanian, A, (2012) , “Evangelical, Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches in Latin America and Eastern Europe”, 
Religion, State & Society, March, Vol. 40 Issue 1, p3-10. 
52 Meijer, R. (ed), (2009). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement . New York: Columbia University Press . 
53 Nonnemann, G., Niblock, T., & Szajkowski, B. (1996). Muslim Communities in the New Europe. Berkshire, UK: 
Garnet&Ithaca  
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This depreciation is caused by the social, cultural and linguistic gap between the clerics from the 
countries of origin and the Muslim communities in the West. Islamic religious authorities in Western 
Europe are often more conservative than Muslims at large, and less well-integrated into society. A 
significant body of academic work has focused on this problem, including Frégosi,54 Shadid and van 
Koningsveld,55 Ceylan,56 Peter and Arigita,57 and van Bruinessen.58
A) The Background of Imams and Priests  
 This work concerns the 
sociological background of clerics, the political instrumentalization of religion by sending countries, 
and the training of clerics in the receiving countries. 
On average, imams are foreign born, do not master the language of their host countries, are older than 
the immigrant population, and are characterized by very low religious skills. At the same time, they 
have become instrumental in the policies of the host countries, because they are seen first, as important 
actors in the social integration of Muslim immigrants and second, as possible partners in the fight 
against radicalization, especially since 9/11. For both reasons, actors from the sending states try to 
maintain influence among their former nationals and face increasing competition from migrants 
themselves, from transnational religious leaders and even from the receiving states. 
lmoet Boender and Meryem Kanma, discussing the Netherlands, give a neat summary of the 
political challenge faced by European countries: “Can imams function as intermediaries between 
European and Islamic societies…to what extent to the countries of origin exert a political and 
ideological influence on Muslims in the host countries through these “key figures”; how can these men 
function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch; how do they interpret the norms and values of 
their host societies; should they not receive their education in the their host country rather than in their 
country of origin?”59
Politicians across Europe repeatedly express suspicion toward imams. In 2013, in an effort to 
counter radicalization, the Belgian foreign minister, Didier Reynders, announced different measures to 
control imams’ discourses in mosques as well as their training.
 A primary concern is that the enduring influence of imams who are under-
integrated into their host societies creates a sociocultural, political, and linguistic gap between clerics 
and the communities they have authority over. These questions can also be interpreted in relation to 
the cases of many European countries and immigrant Muslim leaders.  
60 According to Le Monde, data 
collected by the Interior Ministry indicate that France expelled 166 Islamists, including 31 imams, 
between September 2001 and 2011. In 2012, the Swedish state television (SVT) revealed that 6 out of 
10 mosques in the country provide counseling in contradiction with Swedish laws on issues of the face 
veil, polygamous marriages, domestic violence and nonconsensual marital sex.61
                                                     
54 Franck Frégosi, La formation des cadres religieux musulmans en France: approches socio-juridiques, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 1998. 
  
55 Boender and Kanmaz in Wasif A. R. Shadid and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (editors), Intercultural Relations and 
Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union, Leuven, Peeters, 2002 
56 Rauf Ceylan, Die Prediger des Islam: Imame - Wer sie sind und was sie wirklich wollen, Freiburg, Herder, 2010. 
57 Elen Arigita and Frank Peter (editors), “Authorising Islam in Europe,” The Muslim World 96:4 (October 2008). 
58 Martin van Bruinessen, “Making and unmaking Muslim religious authority in Western Europe”, paper presented at the 
Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, 2003. 
59 Boender and Kanmaz in Wasif A. R. Shadid and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (editors), Intercultural Relations and 
Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union, Leuven, Peeters, 2002. 
60 Belgian Foreign Minister wants to monitor Imams. (2013, March 19). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2013/03/19/belgian-foreign-minister-wants-to-monitor-imams/ 
61 Gender Issues and the Hijab/Burqa, Muslim Advocacy Organizations, Public Opinion and Islam in the Media, 
Scandinavia . (2012, May 21). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info:  
http://www.euro-islam.info/category/news-by-issue/gender_issues_and_the_hijab/ 
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According to the study of the Council of British Pakistanis (CBP) in Scotland, most out of 31 
imams, stated that the UK’s foreign policy and misrepresentation of Islam caused violent terrorism in 
the name of Islam. 62
Imams are also suspected of politicizing religion. For example, in 2009 in Milan, the collective 
prayers of Muslims to protest the situation in Gaza was presented by media and politicians as religion 
inciting hatred. In other words, Italian politicians interpreted the imams’ use of prayer as a political 
weapon that ran contrary to the Italian political culture.
  
63
At the same time, Muslim populations across Europe are in dire need of religious leaders to fulfill 
their basic religious requirements, a situation that cannot be ignored by European countries. For 
example, a 2011 internal document of the Dutch Ministry of Justice states a sharp increase in Muslim 
chaplains from 37 to 42, while the overall number of chaplains has gone down from 177 to 160.
  
64
Religious leaders can have a positive influence on social and political integration. Imams in 
Scotland have cooperated with law enforcement officers to diminish gang activities among the youth. 
These imams, mostly Scottish born, did not preach, but performed community service by working 
with the Youth Counseling Agency (YCSA) and Glasgow Community and Safety Services.
  
65 In the 
same vein, it was reported that several imams called on young French Muslims to use their right to 
vote during the two rounds of the presidential elections on April 22 and May 6, 2013. 66
The same goal of fostering positive integration through Islam has justified the organization of 
representative bodies of Islam under the auspices of the state in Belgium, France and Spain. These 
new institutions were perceived at first as a fatal blow to the influence of the countries of origin. 
However, it appears that state actors have redefined their strategy of influence by working within these 
new institutions to maintain connections with their nationals or former nationals.  
  
After 9/11, and even more so after the Madrid bombings and the 7/7 bombings, imams and 
religious institutions in general have been seen as major actors in the fight against radicalization. 
While umbrella Muslim organizations assert general principles, the fight against terrorism is usually 
conducted at the local level by mosques or imams cooperating with the police: this allows for informal 
influence by state and non-state actors from the sending countries. 
In order to foster a peaceful Muslim society in Britain, British born imams led citizenship classes to 
differentiate British Islam from the “al-Qaida version” of Islam, to inspire young Muslims and to 
encourage them to feel part of British society. 67
Dutch mosques have developed a strategy against extremism: three mosques in Amsterdam 
supported and showed interest in cooperating with the plan of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, 
  
                                                     
62 Imams blame foreign policy for rise in extremism. ( 2007 , August 24). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2007/08/24/imams-blame-foreign-policy-for-rise-in-extremism/ 
63 Colosseum prayers during a rally in Milan raise critique of the use of religion for political purposes, calls for sermons in 
Italian (Conflict in Gaza) . ( 2009 , January 21). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2009/01/21/colosseum-prayers-during-a-rally-in-milan-raise-critique-of-the-use-of-religion-for-political-
purposes-calls-for-sermons-in-italian/ 
64 Netherlands to Increase Muslim Clerics as Prison Chaplains. (2011, January 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-
Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/01/30/netherlands-to-increase-muslim-clerics-as-prison-chaplains/ 
65 Scotland: Imams to help police in bid to keep young Muslims away from gang culture. (2009 , February 15). Retrieved July 
19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/02/15/scotland-imams-to-help-police-in-bid-to-keep-
young-muslims-away-from-gang-culture/ 
66 French imams urge Muslims to vote. ( 2012 , April 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2012/04/30/french-imams-urge-muslims-to-vote/ 
67 Imams could lead citizenship lessons. ( 2008 , June 12). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2008/06/12/imams-could-lead-citizenship-lessons/ 
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Jan Peter Balkanende, about fighting terrorism.68 In the same vein, Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen showed appreciation for imams and representatives of Muslim associations who got 
actively involved in a campaign against terrorism. 69
These different initiatives and somewhat contradictory perceptions of imams have drawn attention 
to external influence from the sending countries. 
 
B) Political Instrumentalization of Religious Authorities by the Sending Countries 
The external origin of most European imams has raised questions over the political influence of the 
sending countries. According to a study of the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research in 
2013, 1,800 imams were educated in their countries of origin even though these imams are assigned to 
represent the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants. One of the main challenges for imam 
training is funding. That is why Algeria, Turkey, and Morocco are the primary countries that have 
been sending imams to France. For example, in 2010, the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs sent 
52 Algerian imams to France with the aim of promoting Algeria’s ideas among the immigrant Muslim 
community in France, as well as its stance against the extreme/radical notion of Islam.70 In the 
following year, 180 Moroccan imams came to France for the fast of the month of Ramadan in order to 
enhance Muslim immigrants’ spiritual experiences.71
In 2012, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, represented in Europe by DITIB, decided to 
open a training center in Strasbourg and intended to start training courses for at least 30 French 
students by 2013. The cost of the project, approximately 2 million Euros, is covered by the Turkish 
state, which means that the evaluation of the training will not be performed by French institutions. 
  
72
Germany accepts imams posted by the Turkish government’s Presidency of Religious Affairs, who 
often have a poor knowledge of German and German culture.
  
73 90% of the imams in Germany are of 
Turkish origin and the rest are from Morocco or Iran.74 According to a research report by the Chester 
University, 8% of imams in British mosques are native born, and 6% of them speak English as their 
native language.75
With Islamist governments in power in Turkey and Tunisia, the perception of Islam as a positive 
link with the country of origin is even stronger. Interestingly, these new authorities do not express it as 
an exclusive allegiance, like it was during the strong nationalist phase under authoritarian regimes. For 
example, in 2009, the Fetullah Gullen movement cooperated with the AKP government in Turkey to 
  
                                                     
68 Dutch Mosques Develop Strategy Against Extremism. (2005, September 5). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: 
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launch the “Alliance for Peace and Fairness”, which aims to unite Turkish Muslim communities with 
other Muslim groups in Germany. The leaders of this initiative have also called for all Muslims in 
Germany to use their political rights as citizens of Germany – as voting makes them contribute to the 
political representation of Germany. In these circumstances, Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed his 
support for the creation of a Turkish Muslim community without assimilation and discrimination in 
Germany, one that is in touch with the other Muslim communities in Germany.76
This implicit or explicit recognition of the multiple allegiances of Muslim immigrants by their 
former country of origin goes hand in hand with the growing trend among Muslims in Europe of 
valorization of multiple identities. In contradiction with the 1980s discourse on conflictual identities 
among second and third generation immigrants, research actually shows that people identify 
themselves with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, 
without particular conflicts or tensions. 
 As another sign of 
this acceptance of multiple allegiances, in July 2013 the Turkish government has decided to stop 
judicial pursuits against Turkish citizens abroad who have not fulfilled their military obligations. In 
the same vein, the Islamist regime post-Ben Ali in Tunisia has institutionalized the role of the 
diaspora, granting it eight seats in the Constituent Assembly in the October 2011 elections. 
77
For this reason, Russia’s revival in world affairs in the 2000s has led to an explicit use of religion 
through increasing cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MF) and the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC).
  
78 In the 2000s the Putin administration issued a National Security Concept 
that aimed to stabilize all Russians’ “spiritual and moral welfare” and ensure that foreign religious 
organization and missionaries will be prevented from “destabilizing” Russians outside Russia. In the 
1990s, the leaders of the ROC were afraid that Russia was losing its Orthodox identity and sought the 
state’s help to fight against the influence of other religious groups or sects inside and outside the 
country. Non-orthodox religious groups were depicted as foreign intelligence workers conspiring 
against “Russian policies and strategic activities”.79
                                                     
76 Fethullah got his hands on Germany. (2009, August 30). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-
islam.info/2009/08/30/fethullah-got-his-hands-on-germany/ 
 Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church became a 
tool for the defense of the national and spiritual identity of Russians. “Spiritual security” became 
synonymous with the defense of religious freedom. The 2007 Act of Canonical Communion between 
ROCOR (The Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia) and the Moscow Patriarchate was a new step 
in the Russian government’s efforts to instrumentalize religion for international reasons. The 
unification of the ROC, the ROCO and the Russian President led to a sort of Russian “super-church”. 
ROC congregations in different countries were used as foreign intelligence centers in the 1970s. It was 
speculated that the Russian government could use the ROC congregation today in the same way for its 
geopolitical aims. The 2007 reunification has been seen as the most important and largest overture to 
the Russian diaspora by the Putin administration and the ROC. The ROC and the RFM aim to protect 
Russian citizens’ rights and liberties when living in foreign countries. In addition, the foreign minister 
supports the spiritual needs of the Russian diaspora. This includes building new churches and 
transferring lost properties back to Russian ownership. The re-appropriation of churches built in 
Western Europe prior to the communist period is part of this strategy: they are considered to be a tool 
for the unification of Russian people. There is a debate over the true owners of these properties, the 
Russian state or the Russian Orthodox Church. There is also the question as to which entity can 
supersede the other to influence Russians outside Russia is not clear. In fact, both entities are 
77 Simon, P. (2012, May). French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to the National Community? Institut 
national d’études démographiques (INED) , pp. 1-16. 
78 Payne, D. (2010). Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or 
Cooptation? Journal of Church and State , 712-727. 
79 Anderson, J. (2007). Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia. Journal of International Affairs , 194. 
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strengthened by their “alliance”. In sum, by fighting against the militant secularism and Protestantism 
that permeates European culture, the ROC serves the Russian state’s international strategy. 
Political instrumentalization by the sending countries, as well as concerns about transnational 
religious influence, have led to multiple political initiatives to train imams in receiving countries. 
C) Training of Clerics in the Receiving Countries 
Due to the persistent fear of international influence, receiving states have been taking initiatives to 
select the entry of imams on cultural grounds. They have checked their command of the language as 
well as their political background. They have also initiated training programs.  
Since 2007, all incoming imams to Germany are required to take integration courses (such as 
German language and culture) whether they will be staying in Germany permanently or temporarily.80
For this reason, the Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities) has proposed 
granting both universities and Muslim associations a say in education. The new proposal seeks to 
guarantee the acceptance of Islamic teachers and imams among the believers, and, therefore, allows 
associations to have more influence. Together with the universities, they may take part in decision-
making on what will be taught and by whom. While it is certainly necessary to consult Islamic 
expertise in this matter, the question is whether the largely conservative associations would be the 
best partners. 
 
At the same time, the German state has promoted Islamic Studies chairs in universities to foster a 
greater competence of homegrown Muslim leaders. Greater training for religious authorities is seen as 
a way to combat the dangers of communalism and fundamentalism that could be caused by cultural 
isolation. This initiative raised a lot of criticism from Muslim organizations that did not have a say in 
the curriculum’s definition, even if some faculties do seek advice from local mosques or national 
Muslim associations. In 2008, a case at the University of Münster caused a large debate: Muhammad 
Kalisch, Professor of Islamic Religion, publicly questioned the historical reality of the Prophet 
Mohammed, which caused an outcry among Muslim associations. They called for Prof. Kalisch to step 
down and discouraged students to take up Islamic teacher training in Münster. Because they had no 
say, Kalisch still continues to teach.  
81
In 2007, the UK government addressed imam’s training from the language ability perspective. As 
a result, foreign-born imams who didn’t learn English were required to refrain from giving sermons. 
This ban’s purpose was to increase English-speaking imams, so it would be easier to fight against 
radicalism among young British Muslims.
  
82 Sometimes the training of imams can be assigned to 
other religious institutes, like the Catholic Institute of Paris in France, which in 2008 started training 
Muslim chaplains.83
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In the Netherlands, in the early 2000s, state-subsidized imam-education programs were created and 
there was a requirement that imams recruited from Islamic countries must undergo a year-long 
integration course.84 However, less than a decade later, the only Dutch vocational training course for 
imams is closing, raising doubts over the fruitfulness of efforts to create a “Dutch Islam”.85 Indeed, the 
end of the program at Inholland University echoes more general concerns over integration and imam 
training: “It’s one of our most expensive programmes. A large proportion of the 150 students need 
intensive supervision. We are having to deal with students with different cultural backgrounds.”86
Even in country of recent Muslim immigration, the training of imams has become a political 
priority. For example, a four-day seminary course initiative has been designed in Palermo to train 
imams in Italy, in dialogue with Muslim communities all around Europe. The seminary educates the 
non-Muslims of Sicily about Islamic values. About 30 Muslim imams and different professionals of 
the Muslim community participated in these educational programs, backed by the Islamic Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), cohosted with the Italian Religious Communities 
(COREIS), the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Kuwait and the Municipality of Palermo.
 The 
difficulty faced by this program, and others, is how Islamic education is to be standardized when faced 
with student diversity, differing backgrounds (cultural, religious, and otherwise) and economic concerns.  
87
It is clear that across Europe, imam training is seen as a way of bridging cultural divides and 
integrating immigrants. A common theme across many different countries is the desire to create 
country-specific brands of Islam: “Dutch” Islam, “German” Islam, “French” Islam, and so on. 
Contextualizing and domesticating Islam is meant to foster attachment to a host country. Some 
scholars push back on government emphasis on imams solely; Jørgen Nielsen, for example, notes 
“most research shows that local imams have only minimal influence over their assemblies, with the 
partial exception of [a] few, notorious, extremist imams.”
  
88
IV) The Minority within the Migrant Minority 
 Regardless, governments across Europe 
continue to view domestic imam training as a way of strengthening the attachment of Muslims to host 
societies. Since 9/11 this goal is increasingly linked to security issues. Countries of origin like 
Morocco and Turkey have been using this particular angle to regain religious credibility in the 
receiving countries, by arguing that they can efficiently counter radicalism and Salafism. Interestingly, 
these challenges are much less critical in the case of the minority within the minority, as we will see in 
the next section. 
In addition, to the points highlighted above, surveys on minorities within the minority, like Alevis in 
Germany, highlight a few more specifics of the religious interaction between sending and receiving 
countries. First, in the case of oppressed minorities, migration breaks down the proclaimed religious 
and cultural homogeneity of the sending country by providing visibility and freedom of action. 
Second, this visibility can facilitate the group’s religious integration, when it promotes the same values 
as the receiving country. Third, this visibility is often re-invested in political actions in the country of 
origin and, indeed, beyond. 
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For example, the Alevi declaration in Germany89 in 1989 declared that Alevism is compatible with 
multiculturalism and therefore is a resource for any society in which it operates. It emphasizes Alevi’s 
difference from Sunni Muslims in order to bring Alevis closer to German cultural values. Brochures in 
German on the Sivas massacre of 1993 (where 35 Alevis were killed by an angry mob) read: “Alevis 
do not differ from Germans with regard to fundamental rules and values,” as they, unlike 
fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, value democracy and the rule of law.90
Because Sunni Islam in Germany is perceived negatively and associated with the oppression of 
women, terror, fanaticism and radicalism, Alevis have emphasized their difference to gain legitimacy 
as a distinct Muslim group within German society. For example, in the ongoing controversy over 
female teachers wearing the headscarf in public schools, Alevis have been explicitly opposed to the 
headscarf: they declare it unnecessary in religious terms. Therefore, they implicitly send the message 
that they can integrate within German culture and society. In other words, they present Alevism as the 
embodiment of universal values that has its place in Germany. 
  
According to Soysal (1997),91
For this reason, Alevis have gained greater institutional recognition than Sunni groups. Alevi 
leaders tend to associate with various German civil and governmental institutions, notably in interfaith 
dialogue. They fundraise for their local events by seeking institutional cooperation with municipal 
institutions. They also take advantage of public funding for various projects for disadvantaged youth 
and information for new citizens. While Alevis application for the legal status of “corporation under 
public law” has been pending since 1995, the application of Sunni Islamic organizations has 
immediately been rejected without consideration. This is another illustration of the political advantage 
of Alevis over Sunni Muslims in Germany. In the same vein, AABF, in the Länder of North-Rhine 
Westfalia, Hesse, Berlin and Bavaria has achieved recognition as a religious community in accordance 
with Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law. This paragraph allows them to provide religious studies 
as a standard subject in the Länder specified above.
 more immigrant communities can easily relate to Alevi identity 
politics because of its emphasis on citizenship and human rights issues. Thus, Alevis do not demand their 
rights through religion, but through the language of rights and citizenship. While Sunni Muslims demand 
halal slaughtering and emphasize their specificity, Alevis inscribe their demands within existing German 
law (Alevi rituals do not contradict German law) and the rhetoric of universal human rights. 
92
The grounding of Alevism in German society has also strengthened its political struggle in Turkey 
by giving it global visibility. For example, the Alevi Cultural center in Hamburg has helped the Alevi 
cause by inviting politicians from Turkey such as Arif Sag, a member of Turkish parliament who 
participated in the campaign against anti-Kurdish politics in Iraq. It has also facilitated the 
development of religion by allowing the multiplication of places of worship and traditional teachings 
in Turkey. For example, the AABF assisted the construction of new Cem houses in the city of 
  
                                                     
89 “Alevi Declaration (Alevi Bildirgesi known in Turkish) made in 1989, stated that there were about 20 million Alevis 
among Turkey’s population of (at that time) fifty five million, i.e., that Alevis did not form a small minority. The 
declaration referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Turkish constitution of 1982, both of which 
guarantee the freedom of conscience, opinion and religion. The declaration pointed out that Alevis did not enjoy freedom 
of religion in Turkey. It demanded the official recognition of Alevism in Turkey as an important step towards 
democratization of the country. The declaration also dealt with the situation of Alevis in Germany, stating that because of 
ignorance also in Gemany only Sunnis are taken into account, and that Alevis should enlighten both Sunni fellow 
migrants and the German public about Alevism.”  
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Erzincan. When the funding was very limited in Turkey, the chairman of the AABF himself helped out 
through different German associations. It also allows many humanitarian events such as helping out 
the Alevi victims of the earthquake in the city of Pulumur in 1967. 
Alevi’s relations are not limited to Alevis in Turkey. They extend to the multiple locations of the 
group. In other words, Alevis see their diaspora and the homeland as being interconnected. In this 
regard, the EU space is also an asset for the recognition of the Alevi movement. For example, a 
bilingual brochure (German/Turkish) about discrimination against Alevism in Turkey was sent to the 
EU. The brochure presented Alevism as embodying modernity, tolerance, enlightenment, freedom, 
and rejecting fanaticism, fundamentalism and sharia. The leader of AABK, Turgut Oker, implied that 
with these publications, the organization had the ambition to serve as a mediator in the relations 
between Turkey and Europe.  
As already mentioned, the features described above, most notably disconnection between national 
and religious identities and competition from transnational movements, apply also to migrants who 
share the religion of the receiving countries. They also have specific additional characteristics 
analyzed below. 
V) When the Religion of the Migrants is the Same as the Religion of the Majority in the Host 
Country 
Counter-intuitively, past and recent surveys show that shared religion does not lead to cultural or 
social integration, even if it provides resources for structural integration. Political activism in the 
workplace, however, was and in some cases remains a powerful tool for social integration. For 
example a 2008 survey of Italian, Croatian and Spanish immigrants to Germany show that the 
immigrants and their offspring have not assimilated into the local church, let alone disappear into a 
Catholic “melting pot.” Many of them still live their faith in separate migrant parishes that do not 
foster social integration. In creating these structures, the Church acted similarly to some German 
Länder that offered special schools for immigrant children or local foreigners’ councils in the political 
sphere. The German unions, on the other hand, did not establish special institutions but rather included 
immigrant members in their regular structures.93
At the same time, the parishes could efficiently support their members because of their resources. 
Offering social services, leisure activities, and linking the immigrants in dense networks, they initiated 
structural integration processes.  
  
In the same vein, since Poland joined the European Union in May 2004, it is estimated that over 
half a million Polish nationals have arrived in Britain.94 The presence of Polish migrants has 
significantly transformed Catholic parishes around the UK, by increasing the number of parishioners 
as well as service attendance. The consequence has been a growing anxiety of the autochthonous 
priests over ethnic divides in parishes. The Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor, 
publicly declared his fears of Poles splitting the Catholic Church in Britain, and urged them to 
integrate. He implied that the introduction of Polish masses hindered successful integration. The 
Polish clergy and community in Britain responded passionately and the deputy rector of the Polish 
Catholic Mission, Grazyna Sikorska, felt “spiritually raped” by the Cardinal’s words.95
 
 This public 
disagreement over appropriate pastoral care for Polish migrants and their place in the Catholic Church 
in Britain has unfolded differently across the UK, but most tensions arise at the parish level.  
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As Trezbiatowska states, “Catholic migrants in Britain serve as a good example of a faith group 
currently incapable of overcoming religion-national identity. While it may be true that Catholics of 
different nationalities can understand one another because their religious habitus is formed by the 
same religious institution “that features a very centralized and unifying liturgical spine.” It is not the 
case with Polish Catholic priests in the UK. Their habitus clashes with the local religious field (of 
British Catholics) they have entered, partly because the religious capital they deploy is determined by 
the needs of the consumers – the Polish laity – who expect “Polish”, rather than “universal”, 
Catholicism. Polish priests cannot afford to extend their definition of Catholicism cross- nationally 
because it would de-legitimize their relations with lay Polish migrants. Polish Catholics reinforce their 
Polishness through the use of native language and ethnic rituals, which in turn create “parallel 
congregations.”96
From existing surveys about the majority situation, we can draw the three following conclusions. 
First, the role of the religion in integration varies according to its status in the country of origin. 
According to the survey of Catholic immigrants in Germany, each of the migrant groups’ parishes has 
a different way of understanding integration. For example, for Spanish priests, integration is 
undertaken through education. For Croatians, integration is about national community and finally 
going to back to the fatherland, as well as individual networking. For Italians, integration is about 
political fragmentation. According to the 2002 Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and 
Cultural Affairs among the states in the Federal Republic of Germany, Spanish and Croatian children 
are more successful than Italians: 58.7% of Croatian students and 54.3% of Spanish students accessed 
well-qualified schools, while that was the case for only 30.7% of Italian students. Scholars explain this 
difference by the fact that Spanish priests focus on education more than on religious instruction or 
preservation of origin identity. For the same reason, the percentage of inter-marriage between German 
and Spanish groups is higher than for Croatians or Italians. In contrast, Croatian groups tend to 
preserve their own identities and upward social status, and refrain from inter-marriages. Compared to 
Croatians, Italians are more open to intermarriage, but their children are less successful in schools, 
probably because Italian priests emphasize integration rather than self-organization. 
  
Second, there is the possibility of marginalization of emigrants by the national religious institutions 
of the receiving country. A case in point is the emigrants from the Philippines to Italy, who are still 
perceived as “other” or different even if they share the same religion as the majority. Similarly, 
German Catholics have a higher social status than Catholic immigrants. According to Leuninger 
(1987), even though local parishes were supposed to be open to foreigners and native language 
counseling, immigrant Catholics became secondary church participants, because even if religion was a 
shared heritage, there were many differences in terms of social values.97
2003-2009, the financial and personal support of the German Bishops’ conference for the 
integration of Catholic migrants in Germany has provoked resistance: for example, the Rottenburg-
Stuttgart diocese raised concerns over divided parishes. 
  
98
Again, socioeconomic status, political memory and perceived social distance play a decisive role in 
shaping the influence of religion in the integration process as well as its political relevance for the 
emigration country. More generally, it seems that in this case, religion is trumped by the level of 
modernization of the country of origin in comparison to the immigration country. 
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Menschenwurde:Fakten Analysen and ethische Kriterien (p. 140). Mainz: Matthias Grunewald. 
98 Winterhagen, J., & Thränhardt, D. (2012-13). Three Catholic transnationalisms Italian, Croat, and Spanish immigrants 
compared. Retrieved 07 19, 2013, from Academia.edu:  
http://www.academia.edu/3442401/Three_Catholic_Transnationalism_Italian_Croat_and_Spanish_immigrants_compared 
Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Countries 
INTERACT RR2013/01 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 21 
Third, religious institutions from the sending country can act independently of the state and create 
connection with their counter parts in the receiving countries, thereby operating as an independent 
political force. In some cases, this political influence undermines the influence of the country of 
emigration (as with Spanish priests in immigrant parishes in Germany at the end of the Franco 
regime). In others, religious institutions maintain the diaspora in the cultural and political orbit of the 
emigration country, therefore, reinforcing its influence. For example the Croatian priests in Germany 
at the time of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.99
Overall synthesis 
 
The migration situation has increased, among migrants, a differentiation between personal attachment 
to religion and belonging as a sense of collective identity, both religious or national. This is a 
challenge for sending countries for which religion is part of national identity. It has obliged them to 
diversify their strategies vis-à-vis their former nationals, as well as with the receiving countries. A 
widespread notion of “religious culture” with no fixed content seems to override the more 
circumscribed definition of “being religious” that is usually measured in polls.  
Due to the rise of global proselytizing movements, the influence of the country of origin has to be 
contextualized in broader transnational religious spaces where different actors operate: state actors 
(from both sending and receiving countries), non-state actors from receiving and sending countries 
(religious leaders, intellectuals) and transnational actors (Salafis or Tablighis). 
It seems that in the majority situation, there is a greater independence of the religious institutions of 
the sending countries vis-à-vis the integration policies of the receiving countries. For example, in the 
case of the Catholic Church in the UK, integration strategies remain entirely under the jurisdiction of 
religious leaders, with no interference or guidance from the British state, whereas Muslim 
communities and their religious leaders are subjected to strict visa requirements and state control. The 
same seems true for Catholics in Germany. More studies are needed to find out if the “majority” 
condition is the major cause for this difference in treatment. In other words, is this independence due 
to the fact that the Catholic Church operates as a sort of state? Or is it due to the fact that Catholic 
groups are seen as familiar or closer to the dominant culture, and therefore need less control? 
In sum, from the analysis above, the following six factors seem to influence the role of religion in 
interactions between sending and receiving countries: 
• The preexisting political status of religion in the emigration country;  
• The strong connection between religion and national identity (Muslim countries, Poland, 
Ukraine…); 
• The respective countries’ mutual perception of emigration and immigration: from 
postcolonial memory to specific historical events or contemporary international situations 
(unskilled migration, the war on terrorism…); 
• The influence of transnational religious movements (Salafism, Tablighi, Evangelical 
Movement) that challenge national versions of religion; 
• The social and modernization distances between the emigration and immigration country 
(religion trumped by class). 
                                                     
99 Historically speaking, the first Croatian parishes were formed by the priests that escaped from communist Yugoslavia after 
1945. 1960 was the time when Yugoslav leadership let the Catholic Church send preachers into foreign countries. About 
84 Croatian priests were employed in Germany. In 2010, there were about 96 Croatian priests in Germany. The Croatian 
parishes had an important role in church services for the Catholics who came from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Their bishop or head person of their diocese visited 89% of these parishes in Germany. 71% of these were members of a 
religious order. For example, for the Croatians, the most important religious order has, since the beginning, been the 
Franciscan Order. More recently, Franciscans still represent most of this parish population. 
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Interestingly, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the existing literature on the 
positive or negative role of religion in the integration of migrants.  
The way forward: the influence of religion in migrant integration 
Based on research done by the author,100 it appears that some aspects of religion (like mosque 
attendance or church attendance) favor political participation, while others (like religious self-
identification) do not. As Driskell et al have argued, church attendance is not on its own a significant 
predictor of political participation. Rather, “participating in Church activities (such as choir) and levels 
of church involvement have a positive and significant effect on political participation. Simply sitting 
in the pew appears not to matter; yet participating in various church activities and levels of church 
involvement play a significant role in political participation.”101
 
 
According to existing surveys across different religious groups, religiosity is measured through two 
major indicators: church attendance and self-declaration of religiosity (do you consider yourself: very, 
little, or, not religious). In general, engagement in congregational activities and personal belief as an 
indicator of group consciousness positively influence political participation, defined as more than 
simply voting, to include civic activism (petitioning, demonstration, and voluntarism).  
 
However, our surveys of Muslim immigrants raise the question of whether ethnic diversity 
engenders or inhibits social cohesion and, therefore, trumps religious influence. For example, 
respondents in these surveys expressed feelings of confinement within a specific ethnic or 
sociocultural group along with isolation from mainstream society. This did not foster strong solidarity 
or trust for the majority group. In this sense, focus group discussions validated the “conflict theory” 
that states that isolation fosters out-group distrust. However, two factors seem to change this “conflict” 
situation: the density of the minority group (for example, the percentage of the locality that is 
composed of members of that minority) and the cultural and social diversity of the whole population in 
the locality. For example, a 2008 British study showed that a greater density of ethno-religious 
minorities within a culturally diverse environment leads to higher voter turnout among those 
minorities.102 Therefore, density was far more significant than diversity per se in terms of minority 
political and civic participation. Interestingly, the same survey shows that the density of the Muslim 
population has a negative effect on the non-Muslim majority’s turnout in a given area.103
Other surveys, however, have illustrated the opposite trend and assert that, in fact, ethnic diversity 
has a negative effect on trust and social cohesion. This theory, known as the “constrict theory,” has 
become prominent in the United States.
 In other 
words, diversity and density did not decrease political participation among Muslims, but did 
negatively affect political engagement of members of the majority population.  
104
                                                     
100 See Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
 In the European context, however, this theory is not 
systematically validated by data. On the one hand, some surveys have shown that ethnic diversity 
101 Robyn Driskell, Elizabeth Embry, and Larry Lyon, “Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political 
Participation,” Social Science Quarterly 89 (May 2008): 294-314. 
102 Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts, “Diversity, Density, and Turnout: the Effect of Neighborhood Ethno-religious 
Composition on Voter Turnout in Britain,” Political Geography 27.5 (2008): 530-48. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Putnam argues that diversity “seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation,” asserting 
that “people living in an ethnically diverse setting appear to ‘hunker down’—that is, to pull in like a turtle.”. 
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limits social trust. For example, a Dutch study in 2007, focusing on the neighborhood level, concluded 
that diversity has a negative impact on individual trust among neighbors. Diversity also has a positive 
impact on intra-ethnic trust, which means individuals tend to trust other groups less and trust their own 
ethnic group(s) more.105
Another 2010 study conducted across 19 different countries with various types of immigrants 
concluded that “diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society.”
 
106
Although this survey confirmed that social cohesion can be hindered by ethnic diversity, it also 
emphasized that institutional arrangements can potentially work to counter such hindrance. For 
example, in the 1970s, Sweden and the Netherlands began implementing multiculturalism policies, 
such as funding for ethnic or immigrant organizations and non-majority language learning, along with 
the public recognition of immigrants. These policies have promoted social cohesion and have provided 
immigrants with support and symbolic legitimacy that could increase their “overall stocks of social 
capital as immigrant populations grow”.
 However, the authors nuanced their 
conclusions by emphasizing the role of “institutional arrangements” in determining how diversity affects 
a society. In a country of “greater economic insecurity, residents might feel more threatened by 
immigration and, therefore, withdraw more from collective life.” The study ultimately concedes that the 
relations between immigration and collective mindedness is mediated by institutional structures and state 
policies. If immigration is threatening – economically or culturally – it leads to “hunkering down.”  
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Overall, no clear trend emerges from these different surveys to confirm either the “conflict” or the 
“constrict” (“hunkering down”) theories. Altogether, though, these studies do shed light on a few 
factors that influence the positive or negative effects of ethnic diversity on social cohesion. First, it 
seems that in European contexts, the majority groups more than the minorities tend to “hunker down” 
in an ethnically diverse environment. Second, institutional arrangements and existing policies also 
affect social trust in the context of an ethnically diverse community. Third, for minority groups, other 
elements, such as ethnic density combined with class and socio-economic levels, facilitate or prevent 
social cohesion. Finally, the time cycle of the coexistence of different ethnic and cultural groups seems 
influential. As Putnam points out, hunkering down may simply be a short-term situation that can 
evolve as groups evolve.
 The authors also made clear that “hunkering down” 
concerns the majority groups, not primarily Muslim or other immigrant groups. 
108
Due to these complex layers of factors, scholarly work has political weight. Specifically, it is very 
important to develop analyses that take into account context-level variables, such as policy making, 
institutions, and majority/minority divides, in order to avoid sweeping generalizations about the 
positive or negative influence of ethnic diversity that can be instrumentalized politically. For this 
reason, scholars should be aware of the political use of their generalizations, such as the often blanket 
assertion that “ethnic diversity leads to hunkering down.”
 
109
                                                     
105 Bram Lancee and Jaap Dronkers, “Ethnic Diversity in Neighborhoods and Individual Trust of Immigrants and Natives: a 
Replication of Putnam (2007) in a West-European Country,” paper presented at the International Conference on 
Theoretical Perspectives on Social Cohesion and Social Capitol, Royal Flemish Academic of Belgium for Sciences and 
Arts, May 15, 2008. 
 In this regard, it is important to note that 
the critique of ethnic diversity as eroding social cohesion in Europe, along with the critique of 
multiculturalism, have become staples of anti-immigration discourse. The underlying assumption of 
this discourse is that immigrants show insufficient trust or eagerness to participate in mainstream 
106 Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad, “Does Immigration Erode Social Capital?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 
43 (June 2010): 319-347. 
107 Ibid, 324. 
108 Robert D. Putnam (2007), “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,” The 2006 Johan 
Skytte Prize Lecture, Scandinavian Political Studies 30: 137–174. 
109 For a critique of such generalizations see Bram Lancee and Jaap Dronkers, “Ethnic Diversity in Neighborhoods and 
Individual Trust of Immigrants and Natives: a Replication of Putnam (2007) in a West-European Country.” 
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society, especially immigrants with a Muslim background. The more general the argument concerning 
the negative effects of ethnic diversity, the more political traction it gains for politicians and pundits 
who want to make a case against immigration and welfare politics, even if the premise of such an 
argument is not validated by empirical data.  
In sum, it is not possible to conclude that the more religious an individual migrant is, the more 
politically engaged or disengaged he or she becomes. Other dimensions, such as ethnic affiliation, 
immigrant status, and residential distribution, seem to affect the level and intensity of political 
participation. Unfortunately, none of these dimensions have been systematically and comparatively 
tested across religious immigrant groups in Europe.  
Three primary points from our research can serve as a starting place for further analysis. First, more 
investigation is needed to distinguish Islam as a marker for an identity group from Islam as personal 
faith. The former more positively influences political participation. This is counterintuitive at a time 
when Islam is defined as a collective ideology opposed to the West. Second, context-level variables, 
such as local and/or regional ethnicity, religious makeup, and institutional arrangements, should be 
taken into account in order to establish the relevant correlation between Islam, religion in general, and 
political participation.  
In the same vein, the political culture and existing norms of the region and nations in which 
Muslims live need to be identified, because these are as important as their identification to Islam. This 
refers particularly to the religious distance between Muslim believers and the rest of the population. 
First, the gap is between “religious” migrants and “secular” Europeans. Across European countries, 
the level of self-declared religiosity in the general population is systematically much lower than 
among immigrant groups. In other words, the general context of religiosity and social legitimacy of 
religions in each country is the real discriminatory factor that must be understood is getting to grips 
with the situation of Islam and of Muslims.  
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